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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, one of the largest credit monitoring companies in the United
States—Equifax1—suffered a cybersecurity breach that affected up to 143
million Americans.2 The Equifax hackers gained access to consumers’
names, dates of birth, addresses, and Social Security numbers.3 From those
affected by the data leak, hackers obtained approximately 209,000
consumers’ credit card information.4 Similarly, in October 2017, Yahoo!
announced that it had suffered two separate data breaches that affected all
three billion of its users.5 Along with security questions and answers,
hackers obtained user information, such as names, email addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of birth, and passwords.6 This sensitive
information was eventually bundled and sold on the dark web7 for
approximately $1,800.008 per transaction.9
1. How to Protect Yourself Against the Theft of Your Identity, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/09/
14/how-to-protect-yourself-against-the-theft-of-your-identity [https://perma.cc/H
9GF-MCZX].
2. Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/equifax-data-breach [https://perma.cc/XT7K-58ZW] (last
visited Oct. 10, 2018).
3. 2017 Cybersecurity Incident & Important Consumer Information, EQUIFAX,
https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc
/9GA5-43EL] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
4. Id.
5. Robert McMillan & Ryan Knutson, Yahoo Triples Estimate of Breached
Accounts to 3 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:23 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/yahoo-triples-estimate-of-breached-accounts-to-3-billion-1507062
804 [https://perma.cc/UJ9X-3MNH].
6. Yahoo Security Notice December 14, 2016, YAHOO!, https://help
.yahoo.com/kb/account/SLN27925.html?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/6FBYAYU6] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
7. The dark web is a designated section of the internet. It fundamentally
provides a private, anonymous, and heavily encrypted browsing experience. Some
(but not all) of the dark web’s contents contain illicit material and black-market
trade. Mark Ward, Tor’s Most Visited Hidden Sites Host Child Abuse Images,
BRIT. BROADCASTING CO. (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/tech
nology-30637010 [https://perma.cc/FP7C-LWP8].
8. Paul Szoldra, The Dark Web Marketplace Where You Can Buy 200 Million
Yahoo Accounts Is Under Attack, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2016, 2:09 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/real-deal-market-ddos-2016-9?r=DE&IR=T [https://per
ma.cc/B2FU-Q7TT].
9. Verizon contemporaneously acquired Yahoo! at the time the data breach
became known to the public. Verizon lowered its valuation price by $350 million
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Data breaches occur more frequently than ever because of commercial
entities’ need to store exponentially increasing volumes of digital
information.10 Each year, millions of Americans are left without legal
recourse when hostile hackers steal their information.11 The consequences
are notably damaging, harming consumers and businesses alike.12
Businesses hosting the stolen data can experience substantial lost profits,13
and vulnerable consumers must often take preventive measures14 to
combat identity theft and other fraudulent misuses.15
Consumers seeking recompense from having their data stolen often
take their claims to court for damages in a class action lawsuit. In the
pleading stages of these victims’ lawsuits, however, courts frequently
dismiss the cases for lack of Article III standing.16 Courts reason that
obtaining personal data through a breach is too speculative of a future
damage to be redressable until fraudulent charges have actually occurred.17
This rationale is especially problematic for consumers. As stolen
in response to the data breach’s damaging effect to Yahoo!’s reputation and
competence. Kim S. Nash & Ezequiel Minaya, Due Diligence on Cybersecurity
Becomes Bigger Factor in M&A, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/companies-sharpen-cyber-due-diligence-as-m-a-activityrevs-up-1520226061 [https://perma.cc/LPT9-BA5U].
10. Long Cheng, Fang Liu, & Danfeng (Daphne) Yao, Enterprise Data
Breach: Causes, Challenges, Prevention, and Future Directions, WIRES DATA
MINING KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 1, 2–3 (2017), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/pdf/10.1002/widm.1211 [https://perma.cc/H2EB-GUM9].
11. Michael S. Finkelstein, Overview of Data Breach Litigation in Louisiana:
A Look into Its Uncertain Future, 63 LA. B.J. 106 (2015).
12. Warwick Ashford, Data Breaches to Affect Future Sales, COMPUTER
WEEKLY (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252434663/
Data-breaches-set-to-affect-future-sales [https://perma.cc/P5JB-M5VX].
13. For example, Target Corporation’s quarterly earnings dropped 40%, or
$441 million, following a public announcement that the company experienced a
data breach. See Elizabeth A. Harris, Data Breach Hurts Profits at Target, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/
business/target-reports-on-fourth-quarter-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/GE3YKHHF].
14. In a global survey of 7,500 consumers, 90% feared that their personal
information would be stolen in a future data breach, with identity theft as one of
the primary concerns following a breach. Id.
15. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017); In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
[and] to Controversies . . . .”).
17. Finkelstein, supra note 11.
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information is passed from hand to hand, the chain of causation becomes
attenuated, thus making it difficult for consumers to connect the court’s
identified injury—actual misuse of the information—to the breach.18
Similarly troubling is how hackers make use of the stolen data. Third
parties may hold personal information obtained in a data breach for years
before committing identity theft.19 Consequently, once hackers sell stolen
data on the internet, fraudulent use of the personal information may
continue for years in varying ways.20
Contrary to this reasoning, conferring standing for data breach claims
is an appropriate outcome that ultimately benefits both consumers and
businesses.21 If courts acknowledge standing for data breach plaintiffs,
businesses could be held liable for failing to protect consumer data,
thereby causing businesses to heighten their security standards.22
Businesses, in turn, will have a lower susceptibility of having their
cybersecurity compromised, have higher consumer retention rate, and
avoid a costly public backlash.23 These long-term benefits, while costly in
the short run, are extremely valuable for preserving profits and mitigating
the many expenses associated with a data breach.24
18. Jennifer Wilt, Cancelled Credit Cards: Substantial Risk of Future Injury
as a Basis for Standing in Data Breach Cases, 71 SMU L. REV. 615 (2018).
19. To add yet another wrinkle in the standing analysis, in instances where
actual fraud takes years to occur, data breach litigants cannot achieve standing
because their cases prescribe.
20. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007).
21. JONATHON CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME 231 (2d ed. 2015)
(“While the most obvious impact of identity crime is financial, most of the cost is
in fact borne by institutions rather than individuals. In addition to direct financial
losses, there are costs associated with reporting, investigating and rectifying
instances of identity crime.”).
22. Travis LeBlanc, A Wake-Up Call: Data Breach Standing Is Getting
Easier, 4 CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.bsfllp.com/
images/content/2/9/v2/2995/2018-01-17-Cyber-Security-Wake-Up-Call-Data-Br
each-Standing-Is.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF4H-S52P].
23. See McMillan & Knutson, supra note 5, for an example of how costly a
data breach can be for a business. Verizon was in the process of acquiring Yahoo!
prior to the breach and valued its target company at $4.83 billion. Following the
breach, Verizon instead paid $4.48 billion, $350 million less than its initial
valuation. See also Nash & Minaya, supra note 9.
24. Herb Weisbaum, The Total Cost of a Data Breach – Including Lost
Business – Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews
.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-including-lost-business-keeps-gr
owing-n895826 [https://perma.cc/L57D-DY8R].
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This Comment will highlight and attempt to harmonize the disparities
among federal courts’ standing analyses that arise from data breach
litigation. Part I provides background on data breaches and the foundation
for standing under Article III of the Constitution. Part II discusses how the
United States Supreme Court case Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
drastically affects the standing analysis for litigants who allege an
increased risk of fraud and identity theft following a data breach.25 Part III
highlights the federal circuit split originating from post-Clapper data
breach standing cases. Part IV identifies the various methods that courts
can use to confer standing for data breach litigants and offers statutory
reformation and judicial review as potential resolutions for standing in
data breach cases. This Comment concludes by urging the Supreme Court
to grant a writ of certiorari for a data breach case to provide a uniform
standing rule for data breach litigants across the country.
I. OVERVIEW OF DATA BREACHES AND ARTICLE III STANDING
As time’s arrow marches forward,26 businesses small and large grow
increasingly dependent on customers’ information to maintain growth and
profits.27 In turn, the vast quantities of information that companies store
form enlarged targets for hackers.28 These caches of personal information
have become the targets of many hackers looking to exploit weak
cybersecurity barriers for their own benefit.29
A. Brief Overview of Data Breaches
As society continues to become more internet-dependent, the data
stored on computers and cell phones are becoming an increasingly
25. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
26. Bojack Horseman: Time’s Arrow (Netflix Sept. 8, 2017).
27. The International Data Corporation forecasts that the Global Datasphere
will grow to 175 zettabytes. For reference, one zettabyte is equal to one trillion
gigabytes. See David Reinsel, John Gantz, & John Rydning, The Digitization of
the World from Edge to Core, INT’L DATA CORP. (Nov. 2018), https://www.sea
gate.com/files/www-content/our-story/trends/files/idc-seagate-dataagewhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD2T-GAPE].
28. David W. Smith, Every Company in the World Will Be Hacked in Five
Years, EUREKA (Nov. 8, 2017), https://eureka.eu.com/gdpr/every-company-hack
ed-within-five-years/ [https://perma.cc/G6G8-9EH3].
29. Once Stolen, What Do Hackers Do with Your Data?, SECPLICITY (May
18, 2017), https://www.secplicity.org/2017/05/18/stolen-hackers-data/ [https://
perma.cc/8JZM-T4GH].
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valuable commodity and ought to be protected as such.30 Commercial
entities have, to an extent, transformed into digital vaults containing
masses of sensitive consumer information, including names, dates of birth,
Social Security numbers, passwords, email addresses, and more.31 This
sensitive information is valuable not only to businesses and consumers,
but also to “black-hat hackers.”32 These nefarious hackers are capable of
making sophisticated attacks on businesses’ cybersecurity to obtain
consumer information.33 A hacker capable of penetrating a company’s
consumer database may engage in numerous fraudulent activities,34 such
as identity crimes, credit card skimming, and fraudulent electronic transfer
of funds.35 The distressing possibility of having one’s identity stolen in the
aftermath of a data breach is concerning.36 Even more concerning is the
fact that breaches in large corporations have cumulated millions of victims
at a time.37 In an instance where hackers compromise personal data
through a cybersecurity breach, the consumers may seek a resolution

30. The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/96HB
-2MRD].
31. Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Personal Data (and Who Is Using
It), WIRED, (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-person
al-data-collection/ [https://perma.cc/E69X-7YJQ].
32. Robert Moore, CYBERCRIME: INVESTIGATING HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
COMPUTER CRIME, 24 (2d ed. 2011) (describing a black-hat hacker as someone
who “violate[s] computer security for little reason beyond maliciousness or for
personal gain”).
33. CLOUGH, supra note 21, at 56.
34. CLOUGH, supra note 21, at 216–219.
35. There are numerous potential injuries to consumers who are victims of
data breaches. This Comment will focus on the potential for identity theft for the
purposes of examining jurisprudence. In the majority of cases, data breach
plaintiffs assert future identity theft as the injury-in-fact.
36. See, e.g., Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 2008) (wherein
a criminal used information on a published traffic citation to obtain a false driver’s
license and make purchases in the victim’s name); Data Breaches, IDENTITY
THEFT RESOURCE CTR., https://www.idtheftcenter.org/knowledge-base/category
/crimidt/ [https://perma.cc/VES2-XYGR] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
37. See In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154,
1157 (D. Minn. 2014) (“[O]ver a period of more than three weeks during the 2013
holiday shopping season, computer hackers stole credit- and debit-card
information and other personal information for approximately 110 million
customers of Target’s retail stores.”).
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through the judicial system, but not without first passing a traditionally
broad hurdle: Article III standing.38
B. Standing Principles
Standing is a judicially enforced principle that requires a litigant to
prove that a justiciable controversy exists in order to appear before a
court.39 In the federal system, the doctrine emanates from Article III of the
United States Constitution, which in pertinent part declares, “The Judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and] to Controversies . . . .”40 Through
a lengthy line of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court molded the “cases and
controversies” language of Article III into the standing requirement to
promote the separation of powers.41 The Supreme Court created the
standing doctrine to limit its federal judicial power by hearing and
deciding only justiciable conflicts.42
The Supreme Court determines the existence of standing based on
“whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues.”43 The standing requirement mandates three
prerequisites a litigant must satisfy: (1) the plaintiff must suffer from a
concrete and particularized injury-in-fact that is either actual or imminent;
(2) the injury incurred must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions;
and (3) the injury must be redressable by a favorable court decision.44 The
standing analysis prevents abuse of judicial powers by limiting standing
to plaintiffs who have been personally injured.45 Otherwise, lawsuits
would flood the federal courts as unaffected third parties seek judicial
remedies for any legal issue that they may encounter.46
38. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
39. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 96–97 (Yale
University Press 2017) (hereinafter “CHEMERINKSY I”).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
41. In limiting its ability to only hear cases and controversies, the Supreme
Court is prevented from using powers reserved for the executive and legislative
branches of government. See Fairchild, 258 U.S. 126; Poe v. Ullmann, 367 U.S.
497 (1961); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see also
CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 39, at 96.
42. CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 39, at 96–97.
43. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
44. Ne. Fla. Chapter Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663–64 (1993) (citations omitted).
45. CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 39, at 96.
46. CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 39, at 111.
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Litigants often find that the “injury-in-fact” element47 bars standing.48
To constitute injury-in-fact, the injury asserted must be “concrete and
particularized”49 and cannot be “conjectural or hypothetical.”50 The actual
injury requirement exists for two reasons.51 First, it incentivizes the
plaintiff to litigate for a court-ordered resolution on an adverse issue, as
opposed to using the court for a mere advisory opinion.52 In theory,
plaintiffs are discouraged from filing a complaint without an actionable
conflict by knowing that their lawsuits would be dismissed in the early
stages of litigation, effectively closing the judicial floodgates to frivolous
claims.53 Second, a plaintiff who suffers an injury relies on the court’s
resolution to right the wrong, creating a “personal stake” in the case’s
outcome.54 In essence, requiring such specificity for an injury provides
motivation to plead a case and a resolution to a specific conflict.
II. THE EFFECTS OF OVATION—HOW CLAPPER V. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA CHANGED THE STANDING ANALYSIS
In contrast to the enduring standing doctrine, data breaches have only
recently received attention because of the large scope of cyberattacks and
developing efforts to combat them.55 Lower federal courts remain
conflicted about whether the risk of future harm could constitute an injuryin-fact when assessing the legal ramifications of the data breach cases.56

47. Similar to the injury-in-fact requirement, the second and third elements
to standing have complex, varied, and, in some cases, contradictory
interpretations that exceed the scope of this Comment.
48. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (finding
that a damage to occur “soon” is too attenuated to qualify as an injury-in-fact);
see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (finding no injury-infact where an injury was uncertain to happen again in the future).
49. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
62 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2015) (hereinafter “CHEMERINSKY II”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where It
All Goes, TRENDMICRO (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/
us/security/news/cyber-attacks/data-breach-101 [https://perma.cc/G9H4-V87T].
56. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., No. CIV.A. 10-5142 JLL, 2011 WL
735512, (D.N.J. 2011); see also Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th
Cir. 2007).
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These early data breach cases have expanded to become the backbone for
modern data breach standing analyses.57
A. Pre-Clapper Prelude for Data Breach Litigants
Prior to Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, federal courts had
differing opinions on Article III standing in data breach cases.58 Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp. is a landmark case in which the District Court of New
Jersey applied the standing doctrine to the complex nature of data breach
litigation.59 In Reilly, the defendant–company suffered a cybersecurity
breach that resulted in hackers accessing 27,000 individuals’ information,
including full names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and bank
account numbers.60 In denying the plaintiffs’ standing, the court ruled that
the plaintiffs failed to allege “any actual or imminent injury-in-fact”
simply because the breach had yet to inflict pecuniary damages.61 Rather
than finding the breach itself sufficient to constitute injury to plaintiff, the
court narrowly reasoned that because the assailants had not yet misused
the information, harm from the breach itself—and thus injury—had not
occurred.62 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision.63
Compare Reilly with the Seventh Circuit case Pisciotta v. Old
National Bancorp, another pioneer in the progression of data breach
litigation and the antithesis to Reilly.64 In Pisciotta, the plaintiffs submitted
an online application to the defendant–company’s banking services by
inputting their names, addresses, Social Security numbers, driver’s license
numbers, dates of birth, and credit card information.65 Following the
plaintiffs’ applications, the defendant–company fell victim to a
“sophisticated, intentional and malicious” cyberattack from a third-party
57. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., No. CIV.A. 10-5142 JLL, 2011 WL
735512, (D.N.J. 2011); see also Pisciotta, 499 F.3d 629.
58. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). See also Jane T. Haviland & Kevin M. McGinty,
Supreme Court Declines to Address Circuit Split on Data Breach Standing Issue,
MINTZ (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/201802-supreme-court-declines-address-circuit-split-data-breach [https://perma.cc/8
ADF-39XY].
59. Reilly, 2011 WL 735512 (D.N.J. 2011).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id. at *5.
63. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3rd Cir. 2011).
64. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
65. Id. at 631.
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hacker who stole the customers’ personal and financial information.66 The
plaintiffs asserted that they had incurred, and would continue to incur,
expenses in their efforts to prevent misuse of their personal and financial
information.67 Similar to Reilly, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs had not suffered from identity theft at the time of filing, nor did
any financial losses occur in their accounts.68 The Pisciotta court,
however, disagreed with Reilly’s holding that the hackers’ failure to yet
misuse the information necessarily resulted in denying Article III
standing.69
Rather, the Pisciotta court reasoned that a defendant’s action that
increases a plaintiff’s risk of future harm could satisfy standing’s injuryin-fact requirement.70 According to Pisciotta, if the plaintiff faces a greater
potential for harm following the defendant–company’s failure to protect
personal information, the plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient
to satisfy the standing requirement.71 Unfortunately for the litigants, state
law prevented the lawsuit from advancing past summary judgment
stages,72 but the Pisciotta court’s forward-thinking approach to future
injuries persisted.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 632.
68. Id.
69. “Many of those [data breach] cases have concluded that the federal courts
lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs whose data has been compromised, but not yet
misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III
standing. We are not persuaded with the reasoning of these cases.” Id. at 634
(citing Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.
2007); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., 2006 WL 2850042, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3 2006)
(unpublished); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006);
Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC., 2006 WL 2177036, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31,
2006) (unpublished)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 634, 640.
72. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs did not come forth with any
case or statute from Indiana state law recognizing that the plaintiffs had a theory
of recovery. The federal court refused to create a substantive state law for Indiana.
See id. (“We decline to adopt a ‘substantive innovation’ in state law . . . or ‘to
invent what would be a truly novel tort claim’ on behalf of the state . . . absent
some authority to suggest that the approval of the Supreme Court of Indiana is
forthcoming.”).
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Reilly and Pisciotta established the foundation for two divisive
interpretations of Article III standing in data breach cases.73 A court’s
narrow interpretation of the standing doctrine denies a right of action to a
data breach plaintiff: If direct financial injury does not occur following the
breach, the plaintiff cannot sufficiently assert injury-in-fact.74 In contrast,
a broad interpretation of the standing doctrine allows a plaintiff to claim
substantive future harms as an injury-in-fact.75 Although these conflicting
interpretations of standing seemed polarizing, the 2013 Supreme Court
decision of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA proved to separate them
even further.76
B. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA considers temporal issues of
future injuries similar to data breach cases and provides a logical
framework that substantiates Article III standing for a data breach.77 The
Clapper suit arose from a constitutional challenge to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),78 an ordinance that allowed the
National Security Agency (NSA) to surveil individuals located outside of
the United States.79 The plaintiffs, primarily composed of attorneys who
represented foreign individuals, argued that FISA created an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” of injury by intercepting protected attorney–client
communications through government surveillance in the future.80 Further,
the plaintiffs argued that FISA forced them to take “costly and burdensome
measures” to protect privileged attorney–client information; these
measures included ceasing phone and email communications altogether
and traveling abroad to have face-to-face conversations.81 The case hinged

73. See generally In re Horizon Healthcare Serv. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846
F.3d 625 (3rd Cir. 2017); Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D.
Ill. 2012).
74. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011).
75. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634.
76. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
77. Id. Newer Supreme Court cases coexist as precedent for standing, but
Clapper contains comparable future injury issues and is most commonly cited in
data breach cases. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2018).
79. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401.
80. Id. at 410.
81. Id. at 407.
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on the injury-in-fact prong of the standing analysis because the NSA had
not yet intercepted privileged attorney–client information under FISA.82
The Clapper plaintiffs experienced difficulty arguing this
constitutional claim against FISA for two reasons.83 First, considering the
national security nature of the statute, privileged attorney–client
information, and international relations between the United States and
foreign citizens in a post-9/11 America,84 the lawsuit demanded a more
scrutinizing standing analysis.85 Second, the plaintiffs faced an uphill
battle in claiming that standing existed by virtue of five imminent,
interdependent events.86
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs,
concluding that the future harm alleged was neither imminent nor certainly
impending.87 The Court found that the prior requirement of an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” of a future injury did not satisfy standing’s
“certainly impending” injury-in-fact standard.88 The Court also addressed
the plaintiffs’ alleged damages caused by the measures they had taken to
avoid FISA-authorized surveillance, such as traveling to foreign territories

82. Id. at 406.
83. Thomas Martecchini, A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs:
Preserving Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft after Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (2016).
84. Id.
85. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry
has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force
us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the
Federal Government was unconstitutional.”).
86. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410 (The Supreme Court reasoned that, in order to
find an impending threat of future injury, five future actions must occur: “(1) the
Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with
whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke
its authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance;
(3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy
§ 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment;
(4) the Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of
respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular
communications that the Government intercepts.”).
87. Id. at 414.
88. Id. at 410 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (“As
an initial matter, the Second Circuit’s ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard
is inconsistent with our requirement that ‘threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury-in-fact.’”).
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to communicate with their clients.89 The costs incurred to avoid
government monitoring were based on an uncertain fear of surveillance
because the government had not yet intercepted privileged attorney–client
communications.90 Any of the plaintiffs’ injuries sustained in maintaining
privacy, therefore, were self-inflicted and founded on concerns over nonimminent, “hypothetical future harm.”91
Properly interpreted, Clapper’s assertion that a future injury-in-fact
must be “certainly impending” did not create a drastically heightened
requirement to confer standing onto a plaintiff.92 Buried within footnote
five of Clapper’s majority opinion, Justice Alito wrote, “Our cases do not
uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain that
the harms they identify will come about.”93 Additionally, Clapper did not
overrule prior Supreme Court cases where future harm had not yet
occurred, even when their injury-in-fact standards were lower than
“certainly impending.”94
The Court’s acknowledgment in Clapper that standing did not have to
be literally certain has huge implications on constitutional standing: If the
future injury-in-fact does not have to be certain, what is the effect of the
“certainly impending” language?95 The phrase is subject to a variety of
different interpretations,96 but two conclusions must be drawn from Justice
Alito’s assertion.97 First, a future injury-in-fact does not have to be literally
89. Id. at 414.
90. Id. at 417.
91. Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
92. Contra Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 364–54 (M.D. Pa.
2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court reiterated that a threatened injury must be ‘certainly
impending.’ This standard establishes a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to recover
for injuries which have not in fact occurred, even if they appear likely or
probable.”).
93. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5.
94. See id. (citations omitted) (“In some instances, we have found standing
based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs
to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 432–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Prior Supreme Court interpretations
of certainty include: reasonable probability; substantially likely; realistic danger;
and sufficient likelihood. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“realistic danger”); Mansanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139, 154–55 (2010) (“reasonable probability”); Pennell v. San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (“realistic danger”); Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House
of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 333 (1999) (“substantially likely”); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432 (1998) (“sufficient likelihood of . . . injury”).
97. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5.
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certain to qualify for Article III standing.98 Second, “substantial risk” of
future injury and “certainly impending” risk of future harm are distinct
standards, but the “certainly impending” standard does not overrule the
“substantial risk” standard.99
The Court implicitly reasoned that an “objectively reasonable
likelihood” of an imminent damage is a lower threshold for injury-in-fact
than “certainly impending.” Although the Court did not articulate the
difference between “impending” and “imminent,” it inferred that the
injury must be highly probable under the certainly impending standard.100
In effect, because of the ambiguity surrounding a heightened standard for
injury-in-fact imposed by Clapper, confusion continues to afflict the lower
courts, particularly for data breach cases. Despite Clapper’s statement that
“threatened injury must be certainly impending,” the Court itself
acknowledge that “imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic
concept.”101 The Court’s admission illustrates how inappropriate it is to
rely solely on the temporal confines of a certainly impending injury-infact in the context of a data breach.102 And yet, even after the Supreme
Court clarified this standard,103 federal courts continue to apply the
certainly impending standard to assert that data breach victims’ injuries
are merely speculative and too attenuated to qualify for standing.104
III. THE CLAPTERMATH
Clapper’s aftermath has left lower courts in conflict over the proper
standing analysis in data breach cases.105 Using the facts and the Supreme
Court’s logic set forth in Clapper, some lower courts have found that an
increased risk in identity theft and supplemental harms following a data
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. STEVEN L. EMANUEL, EMANUEL LAW OUTLINES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
742 (34th ed. 2016).
101. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 432.
102. Id.
103. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (citing
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414). (“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the
threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the
harm will occur.”).
104. Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 Fed. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
105. See, e.g., Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d. 333, 338
(“[T]his Court observed that the Second Circuit had not weighed in on the issue
of whether increased risk of identity theft is sufficient for standing in a data breach
case . . . . This Court also observed that courts—both circuit and district courts—
have split over that issue and reached different results.”).
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breach does not meet the “certainly impending” standard.106 Additionally,
there is an implicit notion that plaintiffs may rest between the “substantial
risk” standard and the heightened “certainly impending” standard and still
achieve Article III standing.107 Because of the ambiguity surrounding
Clapper, however, it remains unclear what this middle ground is and if this
middle ground grants standing to litigants.108
Plaintiffs who fail to appropriately connect Clapper to their data
breach claims as resulting in imminent injury further experience
difficulties when a court inappropriately focuses on the failure to
sufficiently connect an injury to the initial breach.109 District and appellate
courts often perpetuate the issue by relying on different opinions from
sister circuits, causing greater dissonance among varying judicial
decisions.110 Every case contains remarkably similar fact patterns, yet,
depending on the jurisdiction, courts reach wildly different outcomes.111
Courts that do not confer standing to data breach plaintiffs often
narrowly interpret Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard. These
decisions deter plaintiffs from seeking a judicial resolution for injuries
from data breaches, such as increased risk of identity theft and lost time
and money.112 Federal courts that do not find standing for data breach

106. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3rd Cir. 2011).
(“Appellants’ contentions rely on speculation that the hacker: (1) read, copied,
and understood their personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal
acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the
detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in Appellants’
names. Unless and until these conjectures come true, Appellants have not suffered
any injury; there has been no misuse of the information, and thus, no harm.”).
107. See Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524 (2016)
(“Acknowledging that Clapper requires a ‘certainly impending’ future injury, or
at least a ‘substantial risk’ of injury . . . .”).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 532. (“Khan’s allegations fall short. Unlike in Krottner or
Remijas, Khan alleges no facts indicating that the hackers have attempted to
engage in any misuse of CNHS patients’ personal information since the breach
was discovered. She alleges no suspicious activity: no unauthorized bank accounts
or credit cards, no medical fraud or identity theft, and no targeted solicitations for
health care products or services.”).
110. See, e.g., id. (citing In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–59
(D. Nev. 2015); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363, 366 (M.D. Pa.
2015); In re SuperValu, Inc., 2016 WL 81792, at *5 (D. Minn. 2016).
111. Compare Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, with Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d 359.
112. Michael R. Pennington, Two More Circuits Find Data Breach Standing
Without Proof that Plaintiffs’ Data Was Misused, DECLASSIFIED (Apr. 24, 2018),

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 243

8/17/20 7:19 AM

900

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

litigants dismiss the cases because, despite hackers’ unauthorized access
and theft of plaintiffs’ information, no fraudulent activity actually
occurred.113 For example, one court ruled that the risk of future fraud was
“too attenuated” from the initial breach.114 Often in data breach cases,
however, the fraudulent use of the data does not occur until months, or
even years, after the initial breach.115 Thus, no justiciable controversy
exists, despite obvious damages—including expenses for precautionary
measures, lost time, lost credit rewards, and reduced credit scores—that
impact millions of people at a time.116
A. Data Breach Cases Confined to Narrow Interpretations of Clapper
Khan v. Children’s National Health Systems is a data breach case
where the United States District Court of Maryland narrowly read Clapper
to reject standing.117 In Khan, the defendant–hospital fell victim to an
email phishing scheme118 that allowed hackers to access employees’ email
accounts and content.119 The acquired information included patients’
personally identifiable information, such as names, addresses, dates of
birth, and email addresses.120 For some victims, the email contents also
included medical diagnoses, treatment records, and health insurance
information.121 In response to the data breach, the hospital notified 18,000

https://www.classactiondeclassified.com/2018/04/two-circuits-find-data-breachstanding-without-proof-plaintiffs-data-misused/ [https://perma.cc/S8M5-6R6E].
113. See, e.g., Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d. 359.
114. See, e.g., Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 Fed. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir.
2017).
115. The lapse in time between the breach and actual misuse of information
may be extended to the point where the claim may be prescribed. Supra note 19.
See also In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Nev. 2015).
116. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 386 (6th
Cir. 2016).
117. 188 F. Supp. 3d 524 (D. Md. 2016).
118. “‘Phishing’. . . may broadly be defined as ‘the creation and use by
criminals of emails and websites . . . in an attempt to gather personal, financial
and sensitive information.’” CLOUGH, supra note 21 at 220 (quoting Binational
Working Group on Cross-Border Mass Marketing Fraud, Report on Phishing: A
Report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and
the Attorney General of the United States (2006)).
119. Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d 524.
120. Id. at 527.
121. The information obtained did not include medical records or patient
charts but did contain “private health care information.” Id.
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patients that their personal information had been stolen, and the patients
promptly filed suit.122
The named Khan plaintiff in the class-action lawsuit alleged an
imminent threat of identity theft as a future injury, and she alleged out-ofpocket costs incurred to defend herself against identity and credit theft as
actual injuries.123 The court iterated that, although an unknown third party
had compromised the plaintiff’s personal information, she failed to allege
actual misuse of such information.124 The court considered whether the
hackers intended to obtain the patient data and challenged the hackers’
ability to actually misuse the information.125 Additionally, the court
asserted that if the hackers obtained information as an unintended
byproduct from a cyberattack,126 the future risk of fraud or identity theft is
not certain.127 Under the Khan analysis, a data breach litigant who does
not assert actual misuse of the hacked information does not meet Clapper’s
“certainly impending” standard of injury-in-fact.128
Similar to Khan, data breach victims in Storm v. Paytime, Inc., filed a
class-action suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the
defendant–company for failing to protect sensitive information in a
cybersecurity breach.129 To carry out its contracted services with the
plaintiffs,130 the defendant–company possessed the plaintiffs’ full legal
122. Id.
123. Id. at 527, 529.
124. The court specifically listed examples that could have qualified as misuse.
These examples included unauthorized access to bank accounts or credit cards,
medical fraud, identity theft, and targeted solicitations for health care products or
services. Id. at 532.
125. Id. at 532–33 (“Thus, the allegations are more akin to those in Reilly,
where the hackers ‘potentially gained access to personal and financial
information,’ but it was unclear ‘whether the hacker read, copied or understood’
the plaintiffs’ personal data, and there was no indication of misuse.”).
126. The court reasoned that, rather than obtaining the patient information, the
cyberattack was only intended to gain access to the hospital employees’ email
accounts. This line of logic problematically failed to address the possibility that
the hospital employees’ email accounts were targeted for the high likelihood of
containing sensitive patient information. Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 532–33.
127. Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (“[T]here [was] no indication that the
patients’ personal data was actually viewed, accessed, or copied, or was even the
target of the phishing scheme.”).
128. Id.
129. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
130. The defendant–company offered services to the plaintiffs’ employer, such
as payroll services, human resource management, and hourly wage submission.
Id.
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names, addresses, bank account data, Social Security numbers, and dates
of birth.131 The defendant–company suffered a security breach by
unknown hackers who gained access to the 233,000 victims’ personal and
financial information.132 In an attempt to avoid standing issues resulting
from future harm, the plaintiffs alleged both actual damages and an
increased risk of identity theft.133
The Storm court noted that the plaintiffs did not actually suffer identity
theft, nor did they allege that the hackers actually misused their personal
information in a way that caused pecuniary damages.134 Primarily
influenced by Reilly, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for
failing to allege an actual injury stemming from a heightened risk of
identity theft.135 Indeed, the Storm court narrowly interpreted Clapper’s
“certainly impending” standard, reasoning that because actual misuse of
the data had not occurred after the data breach, identity theft was not
imminent.136 When faced with the claims for out-of-pocket expenses, the
court concluded that the costs incurred were manufactured and
prophylactic to mitigate an injury that had yet to occur in the same vein as
Clapper.137 Thus, the Storm plaintiffs lacked standing.138
B. Broad Interpretations of Clapper in Data Breach Cases
In contrast to the restrictive interpretations found in Khan and Storm,
a growing number of courts have interpreted Clapper in a way that confers
standing for future injuries.139 These opinions primarily differ through
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Plaintiff Wilkinson, a member of the class action lawsuit, alleged actual
damages in conjunction with a heightened risk of identity theft from the data
breach. Wilkinson’s employer suspended his security clearance upon notification
that a third party compromised his information. The employer relocated him to a
different job site, extending his commute to work by four hours. Wilkinson
alleged lost time and travel expenses as actual injuries from the data breach. Id.
134. Id. at 366 (“[The plaintiffs] have not alleged that their bank accounts have
been accessed, that credit cards have been opened in their names, or that unknown
third parties have used their Social Security numbers to impersonate them and
gain access to their accounts.”).
135. Id. (citing Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 2011 WL 735512 (D.N.J. 2011)).
136. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 365.
137. Id. at 363 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416
(2013)).
138. Id. at 368–69.
139. See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th
Cir. 2016); In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197
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application of a broader analysis that confers standing onto data breach
litigants and do not necessarily rely on any subsequent concrete injury that
arises following the breach.140 Instead, the opinions assign the litigants’
original harm as injury-in-fact to the data breach claims and rationalize
that impending damages are substantially likely to occur following a
breach.141
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group is such a case, wherein the
defendant–company fell prey to a cybersecurity breach upon discovering
malware142 installed on its computer systems.143 The hackers received
access to 350,000 credit cards and fraudulently used 9,200 of them.144 The
plaintiffs easily satisfied the Seventh Circuit’s injury-in-fact prong of the
standing inquiry because a sizeable portion of the customers had already
suffered from fraudulent charges.145
Remijas was a fairly noncontroversial case because an actual misuse
of the stolen information occurred.146 The court, however, went a step
further and confronted Clapper’s “certainly impending” language for data
breach victims who had not yet suffered fraudulent charges.147 Rather than
identifying an impending fraudulent activity as the plaintiffs’ injury-infact, the court determined that the act of stealing the information was itself

(N.D. Cal. 2014); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2015); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir.
2016); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
140. See, e.g., Lewert, 819 F.3d 963; In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy
Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197; Remijas, 794 F.3d 688; Galaria, 663 Fed. App’x
at 386; Krottner, 628 F.3d 1139.
141. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
142. Malware, or “malicious software,” is a blanket term that describes any
malicious program or code that is harmful to systems. Cybersecurity Basics,
MALWAREBYTES, https://www.malwarebytes.com/malware/ [https://perma.cc/S
KD3-772P] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
143. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
144. Id. at 692
145. Id.
146. Unlike many data breach cases, some of the Remijas plaintiffs had already
suffered actual injury from fraudulent charges, so they did not have to heavily rely
on the more difficult assertion of an increased risk of identity theft. Id.
147. Id. at 693 (“What about the class members who contend that unreimbursed fraudulent charges and identity theft may happen in the future, and
that these injuries are likely enough that immediate preventive measures are
necessary?”).
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the beginning of the litigants’ injury.148 The court stated that the plaintiffs
“should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit card
fraud in order to give the class standing” because it was likely that such an
injury would occur following a data breach.149 In a provocative conclusion
to the injury-in-fact prong of its standing inquiry, the court posited, “Why
else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or
later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’
identities.”150 The Seventh Circuit’s straightforward reasoning makes
common and logical sense.151 In most data breaches, hackers deploy
technically complex, time-intensive mechanisms to penetrate a company’s
cybersecurity infrastructure and gain access to the consumers’ protected
information.152 The hackers will either misuse this valuable information
themselves or distribute it to other individuals who have an interest in
misusing the information.153 As the Seventh Circuit noted, no alternative
rationale exists for a black-hat hacker to breach a business’s cybersecurity
and steal consumer data. The security breach is thus merely the means to
the black-hat hackers’ ultimate objective: using the protected
information.154
Critics of the Remijas decision have challenged its jurisprudential
value as inconsequential for data breach plaintiffs who have yet to

148. Id at 693. (“[I]n our case, there is no need to speculate as to whether [the
Neiman Marcus customers’] information has been stolen and what information
was taken.”).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. There are alternate explanations for why a hacker would breach a
company’s implemented cybersecurity. For example, “white-hat hackers,” or
“ethical hackers,” are individuals who penetrate cybersecurity barriers to expose
flaws that black-hat hackers could exploit in a future attack. White-hat hackers
typically report this information for the purposes of improving the company’s
cybersecurity. The data breaches referenced above were all unauthorized and
carried out by black-hat hackers. Mark Ward, Sabotage in Cyberspace – The
Threat to National Security from Computer “Terrorists” Are after Nothing More
than an Intellectual Thrill, NEWSCIENTIST (Sept. 14, 1996), https://www.new
scientist.com/article/mg15120471-700-sabotage-in-cyberspace-the-threat-to-national
-security-from-computer-terrorists-is-vastly-overblown-most-hackers-are-after-noth
ing-more-than-an-intellectual-thrill/ [https://perma.cc/YM3R-3U3B] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018).

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 248

8/17/20 7:19 AM

2020]

COMMENT

905

experience actual misuse of their information.155 Nevertheless, the
influence of Remijas’s expansion of the standing analysis can be seen in
the more recent case, Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.156
Galaria demonstrates a broad application of Clapper within a data breach
case where hackers gained unauthorized access to 1.1 million customers’
personal information.157
In Galaria, the Ninth Circuit found that when hackers intentionally
breach a company’s cybersecurity to steal customer data, it is reasonable
to assume that the hackers will commit further harms with the consumers’
information.158 The court reasoned that data breach victims need not
speculate about whether future injury would occur because the injury had
already occurred: Ill-intentioned hackers stole their information.159
Furthermore, the court noted that, following a data breach, expending time
and money to combat misuse of stolen information is not a manufactured
injury but, rather, a concrete injury imposed on the victim to prevent an
imminent harm.160 The Galaria court bolstered the Remijas court’s
opinion by conferring standing onto data breach litigants who had their
sensitive information stolen but not yet misused.161 Appropriately, the
court considered the breach and the resulting theft of information to
constitute an injury in itself.162 In turn, this understanding dismantles the
narrow interpretation of Clapper for data breach cases, which relies on the
actual occurrence of fraud or identity theft following the information
theft.163 The Galaria court’s methods of finding an injury-in-fact may be
used as a foundation for future data breach litigants to plead their cases.

155. For example, the Khan court dismissed the Remijas court’s logic by
asserting that the group of plaintiffs who suffered from actual misuse influenced
the court’s standing decision for the group that had not yet suffered from misuse.
See Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532 (D. Md. 2016) (Unlike in Remijas, “Khan
alleges no facts indicating that the hackers have attempted to engage in any misuse
of CNHS patients’ personal information since the breach was discovered.”).
156. 663 Fed. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016).
157. The information compromised included names, dates of birth, marital
statuses, genders, occupations, employers, Social Security numbers, and driver’s
license numbers. Id.
158. Id. at 388 (“Where a data breach targets personal information, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for
the fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaints.”).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013)).
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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IV. AVAILABLE APPROACHES TO CONFER STANDING TO DATA BREACH
LITIGANTS
Courts that do not confer standing to data breach plaintiffs often
reason that actual misuse of the stolen information has yet to occur.164 This
rationale relies far too heavily on Clapper’s “certainly impending”
standard and does not consider why standing must be conferred onto the
plaintiffs in the first place. Requiring an injury-in-fact ensures that the
plaintiff has a stake in the litigation’s outcome.165 Data breach plaintiffs
are not frivolously filing lawsuits to make a quick dollar. Rather, they are
seeking indemnification from companies that are thought to have
negligently mishandled consumers’ private information. Although this
sentiment alone is undoubtedly insufficient to win an entire case, showing
that an injury has occurred through the breach itself should be adequate to
surpass the low threshold for standing. Under this foundation, a data
breach plaintiff could, at the very least, continue into the pretrial litigation
stage of her claim. Moreover, the defendant–company would still have
ample opportunity to defeat the case in the many other pretrial stages or
on the merits.
Arguably, the origin of the injury should be the moment a hacker
compromises a company’s cybersecurity and obtains the consumers’
private information, provided that the company implements insufficient
cybersecurity measures. Data breach victims suffer an injury by having
their information stolen. Victims suffer a continuing harm by having their
information leaked and through the degradation of their data’s value
through an economic loss principle.166 Accordingly, United States data
breach laws should be altered to implement the data breach itself as
164. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding
that potential misuse of sensitive personal information is not sufficient to establish
a substantial risk of harm).
165. CHEMERINSKY II, supra note 51, at 62.
166. “Economic loss” is pecuniary damage not arising from injury to the
plaintiff’s person or from physical harm to the plaintiff’s property. Ordinarily,
there is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the
performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties. In some instances,
however, a defendant may be liable for pure economic loss. The Third
Restatement of Torts provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, performs a
service for the benefit of others, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their reliance upon the service, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care in performing it.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM, §§1, 3.
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satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement for victims to have access to the
justice system.
Before a legal reconciliation among the circuits can occur, data breach
litigants must be able to sufficiently identify the varying methods of
establishing an injury-in-fact. Adequately pled data breach cases sufficient
for Article III standing may include emphasizing the costs incurred to
mitigate the leak of personal information, identifying the breach itself as
the initial point of injury, and analogizing Supreme Court jurisprudence
that contains legally comparable principles.
A. Data Breach Standing—More Ways than One
Pecuniary damages are the easiest way for a data breach victim to
show that an injury-in-fact occurred.167 In most data breach cases,
plaintiffs incur concrete and tangible expenses for credit monitoring
services.168 In instances where courts do not confer standing on data breach
plaintiffs, the courts address credit monitoring expenses through the lens
of Clapper.169 In re Zappos.com, Inc., for example, determined that the
costs incurred to prevent identity theft and fraud were not enough to confer
standing because the future threat of identity theft was neither imminent
nor immediate.170 Contrary to Clapper’s pertinent facts, data breach
plaintiffs are not, in fact, inflicting harm on themselves from fear of a
hypothetical future harm.171 Rather, the harm is present once the hackers
steal customers’ sensitive information.172 The imminent harm of identity
theft is substantively elevated beyond speculation when consumers’
personal information is stolen.173 Any pecuniary expenses incurred to
mitigate the future risk of identity theft, therefore, cannot be classified as
manufactured standing from a hypothetical harm.174
167. See Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“A ‘concrete’
injury must be ‘de facto;’ that is, it must actually exist. When we have used the
adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—
‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”) (citations omitted).
168. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Beck, 848 F.3d at 268; In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev.
2015).
169. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d at 953.
170. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 415 (2013)).
171. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416.
172. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967
(7th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that an increased risk of fraudulent
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Even if the victims do not experience actual fraud, they must refrain
from using their credit cards, miss opportunities to build credit rewards,
and refrain from making purchases when transitioning cards or credit
services.175 The inability to use a credit card may be seen as only a minor
inconvenience to some, but it should suffice to meet the low bar of injuryin-fact for Article III standing.176 Similarly, the time expended receiving
new government documents, such as a Social Security number or driver’s
license, is material. Courts have found the value of time expended to
mitigate future identity theft to qualify as an injury-in-fact, even in an
instance in which it took only three days to unfreeze a plaintiff’s credit
account.177
These varying methods of conferring standing on a data breach
plaintiff absent a direct pecuniary loss are plausible, especially in light of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example, compare a typical data breach
with the Supreme Court case Davis v. Federal Election Commission.178 In
Davis, the plaintiff, a House of Representatives candidate, sued over a law
that allowed his opponent to receive a disproportionate amount of
campaign contributions in an uncharacteristically beneficial way.179 Both
parties agreed that the opponent had not yet exploited the statute to receive
an unfairly higher amount of campaign contributions.180 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court conferred standing because the plaintiff, at the time of
filing the lawsuit, faced a “realistic and impending threat of direct injury”
that his political opponent would take advantage of the statute.181 The facts
presented under the Davis case can be easily analogized to the facts that a
data breach litigant would assert.182 In the context of a data breach case, a
hacker obtaining consumer information is comparable to the statute at
issue in Davis, which merely granted the capability of exploitation.183
Even if data breach hackers have not yet misused the information at the
moment of the data breach, they have gained the capability to cause an
impending threat of direct injury, constituting an injury-in-fact.184
charges and identity theft were concrete enough to support a lawsuit because
“their data ha[d] already been stolen.” Id. at 967.
175. CHEMERINSKY I, supra note 39, at 101.
176. Id.
177. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2018).
178. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 728 (2008).
179. Id. at 735.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 728.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Similarly, Davis’s political opponent had not yet exploited the statute, but
the court conferred standing because the statute granted the capability of
exploitation.185
Although plaintiffs can show that injuries have occurred in many ways
following a data breach, if Congress or the Supreme Court does not
streamline the litigation process on a national level, different federal
circuits will likely continue to produce contradictory rulings on the issue.
In understanding how data breach litigants may currently structure their
pleadings to sufficiently support injuries-in-fact on an individual level, it
is worth examining how data breach litigation can be restructured on a
national level to avoid the standing issue altogether.
B. Standing Salvation Through Statutory Reformation
Congress should consider enacting a data breach statute that protects
consumer interests by granting a private right of action. The statute would
ideally qualify a data breach as a redressable injury, leaving no room for
ambivalence in a court’s standing analysis. Spokeo v. Robins, a recent
Supreme Court case, speaks to the effectiveness of private rights afforded
under statutory provisions that could be applied to a data breach.186 In
Spokeo, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant–company for
allegedly violating the Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)187 by
publicizing inaccurate personal information.188 The Court spent most of its
discussion determining whether a mere procedural violation of a statute
was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact in the absence of tangible,
concrete injuries.189 The majority opinion held that, although some cases
have held that the procedural violation of a statute satisfies the injury-infact requirement, standing cannot be achieved where the statutory
violation did not result in harm.190 The Court reasoned that the defendant–
company could not have injured the plaintiff simply by disseminating
inaccurate personal information, even if such dissemination violated a
procedural statute.191

185. Id.
186. Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), the statute at issue in Spokeo, requires consumer
reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy” of consumer reports. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1543.
188. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–50.
189. Id. at 1545.
190. Id. at 1550.
191. Id.
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Justice Thomas’s concurrence made a critical distinction between
procedural statutes that govern public rights and private rights.192
According to Justice Thomas, public rights created through federal
legislation often raise standing issues when challenged because the litigant
effectively argues that a public executive agency is not acting in
accordance with the law.193 In this instance, the executive agency is not
necessarily harming the individual directly because the agency’s
procedural violation is likely insufficient to qualify as a substantive
injury.194 In contrast, statutorily created private rights allow a litigant to
assert that another private party violated her individual rights.195 The
majority opinion references these private rights as the type that may
constitute an injury in itself.196 If a defendant violates a duty owed to an
individual, therefore, the statutory violation constitutes a harm in itself and
does not raise the same standing issues as a public right.197
In light of Spokeo, Congress should enact a federal data breach statute
that allows for uniform application throughout the country, preempting
current state data breach legislation.198 Each state has its respective data
breach notification statute that requires businesses to timely notify
consumers when security threats compromise the businesses’
information.199 Every statute contains similar provisions but varying
verbiage and legal ramifications.200 Generally, these data breach
notification statutes contain provisions that provide: (1) what constitutes a
data breach; (2) who must comply with the law; (3) a definition of
“personal information”; and (4) an imposition of responsibility upon
businesses to notify consumers when hackers compromise their
cybersecurity.201 Despite in-depth definitions and clear efforts to protect
consumers’ information in a data breach, not a single piece of state
192. Id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 1552.
194. In matters regarding procedural violations, the plaintiff must show a
nexus between the procedural violation and a substantive injury therefrom. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
195. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 1554.
198. See generally id. (majority opinion); see also Security Breach
Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech
nology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/TY5M-P2HV].
199. Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 198.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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legislation grants a private right of action to the consumers against the
company for negligently handling their private information.202 A federally
enacted data breach protection law would ultimately promote uniformity
in how companies handle data breaches, alleviate complicated
jurisdictional issues,203 and, most importantly, provide a private right of
action for consumers injured in a data breach.204 This right of action would
effectively hold companies responsible for negligently mishandling
consumer data and bypass standing issues by making the source of injury
stem from the violation of the statute itself.205
In drafting the data breach statute, Congress could draw inspiration
from the European Union’s recently enacted General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).206 The GDPR is immensely broad in scope and
encompasses a multitude of rights regarding personal information and
data.207 In summary, the GDPR mandates fundamental rights to protect
consumers’ personal data once the data is under another organization’s
control.208 Should an individual provide personal information to a
business, the business is responsible for safeguarding consumer data
against third parties and is liable for any misuse of data beyond the
consumer’s consent. Any violation of the GDPR, including “material and
non-material damage” resulting from the violation of a company’s
responsibility to protect consumer data, can result in the right to receive
compensation for the injury.209 The legislation notes that “[t]he concept of
damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the
Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of [the]
Regulation.”210 A congressionally enacted statute that draws influence
202. Data breach notification laws typically allow civil recovery of damages
when a business fails to notify consumers of a data breach, but not for the damages
accrued from the breach itself. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3075 (2018).
203. Courtney M. Bowen, Data Breach 101, Part I: Data Breach Notification
Laws, PROSKAUER (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.mindingyourbusinesslitigation
.com/2017/03/data-breach-101-part-i-data-breach-notification-laws/ [https://perma
.cc/922Z-4URX].
204. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
205. Id.
206. Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 of May 4, 2016, on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
207. See generally id.
208. See generally id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
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from the GDPR could serve multiple benefits.211 First, the statute would
provide access to the justice system for data breach litigants by
establishing that the failure to safeguard data is, in fact, a sufficient injury
for Article III standing.212 Second, the statute would incentivize companies
to strengthen their cybersecurity measures to avoid costly litigation
expenses and potential penalties from the government.213 As a result, the
statute would better protect consumers’ information, thwart hackers’
attempts to misuse information, and maintain where consumer information
belongs—the consumers.214
As appealing as a national data breach protection statute may be,
passing a statute that puts large corporations at risk for liability will likely
be extremely difficult given Congress’s current partisan state.215 In a case
of congressional standstill, one more viable alternative remains.
C. Judicial Review for Data Breach Litigation
Considering that Article III standing is a judicially enforced concept,
it is rational for the Supreme Court to dictate whether a data breach would
constitute an injury-in-fact under the standing doctrine.216 Accordingly, a
sensible resolution to the data breach standing conflict involves the
Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari for a pending data breach
case.217
Granting a writ for a data breach case allows the Court to address the
multiple legal issues that specifically cloud data breach litigation: (1) the
211. See generally id.
212. Id.
213. James McGrath, 2.1 Million Reasons to Toughen Up on Data Security,
MYOP (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.myob.com/au/blog/penalties-for-data-secur
ity-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/7ST7-8MPT].
214. See generally GDPR, supra note 206.
215. Personal data protection bills have been proposed in the past, but none
have successfully passed. See, e.g., Data Security and Breach Notification Act of
2015, S. 177, 106th Cong. (2015).
216. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
125 (2014) (“From Article III’s limitation of the judicial power to resolving
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ and the separation-of-powers principles underlying
that limitation, the Supreme Court has deduced a set of requirements that together
make up the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.”).
217. A writ of certiorari orders a lower court to deliver its records from a case
so that a higher court may review them. It is the vehicle that allows a higher court
to hear and rule on a lower court opinion. Writ of certiorari, LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/writ_of_certiorari [https://perma.c
c/D3WJ-RPUX] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
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temporal aspect of future harm from stolen information; (2) whether the
breach itself constitutes an injury or if the personal data must be misused;
and (3) whether the hacked data equates to some form of loss.218 Likewise,
a Supreme Court decision would resolve the standing doctrine circuit split
that plagues the lower courts.219 Ideally, the Supreme Court would rule
that a data breach qualifies as an injury-in-fact, particularly without a
tangible instance of theft. Under this ruling, a data breach plaintiff would
have an opportunity to plead her case before the court beyond the summary
judgment stage of litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Data breach litigation has divided circuits across the country, largely
because of complications from applying the murky, contradictory
language of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and data breach
cases.220 Upon examining Clapper’s language and analyzing the
underlying principles that construct Article III standing, courts should
confer standing on data breach litigants. Judicial opinions that focus too
much on the attenuated circumstances of imminent fraud or identity theft
misconstrue the very reasons why standing is necessary at all. The
fundamental principles of standing ensure that litigants are enforcing their
own individual rights, not the rights of others, and that each plaintiff is
legitimately seeking a judicial resolution, as opposed to a court-ordered
form of legal advice.221
Data breach litigants suffer an injury through the theft of their
personal information.222 The theft itself should be analyzed by the court as
the beginning of the plaintiff’s injury-in-fact, rather than the reasonably
foreseeable end result of fraud or identity theft.223 In addition to the act of
the breach itself, courts should confer standing on data breach litigants for
supplemental injuries, including emotional injury, lost time, and
mitigating circumstances. Under this framework, each data breach
218. Financial and cybersecurity analysts have established that a data breach
can result in economic loss for the company. However, courts have yet to address
whether an economic loss results from the value of the consumers’ data. See, e.g.,
Herb Weisbaum, supra note 24; see also McMillan & Knutson, supra note 5.
219. Resolving Circuit Splits, LEGAL INFORMATION INST., https://www.law
.cornell.edu/supct/cert/supreme_court_2014-2015_term_highlights/part_one/res
olving_circuit_splits [https://perma.cc/P526-87ZU] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
220. See discussion supra Section II.B.
221. See discussion supra Section I.B.
222. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
223. Id.
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plaintiff would be able to have her day in court, as opposed to being denied
in the early standing stage of pretrial litigation. Likewise, where the
plaintiff fails to assert a sufficient injury beyond the motion to dismiss
stages, the court will be able to rule in favor of the defendant after
weighing the pertinent facts of the case.
To resolve the tensions that arise when courts analyze standing for
data breach cases, Congress should enact federal legislation that provides
a private right of action to consumers who suffer a data breach.224 Once a
business fails to protect consumer data, it will be in violation of a private
right of action, which, in turn, will undoubtedly become a justiciable
controversy under the standing doctrine. In the likely case of a
congressional standstill, the Supreme Court should grant a writ of
certiorari for a data breach case on appeal.225 Through judicial review, the
Supreme Court would be the most capable body to resolve the future injury
issues that arise from its Clapper ruling and could award damages to the
consumers at the businesses’ expense. By hearing such a case and
implementing a jurisprudential rule, the Court could further reinforce the
traditional principles of the standing doctrine in a new era dominated by
advanced uses of cybertechnology.

224. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
225. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
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